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I n t r o d u c t i o n
The concept of international customary law is one of the most debated issues of 
international law. There is controversy regarding its constituent elements, the 
process of its formation, indeed, some authors even debate its very existence as 
a separate source of international law.1
On the other hand, as it was famously quipped by Hersch Lauterpacht.....if
international law, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war, 
perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law.":
Putting together these constituent elements they form a potentially explosive 
mix -  customary international humanitarian law. This paper attempts to deci­
pher some of its riddles relying on a formalist methodology of the formation of 
customary international law. ’ It first examines the major problems of custom­
ary international law -  the problems of State practice and opinio juris and the 
weight that should be accorded to them and their relationship with treaties -  
then gives a brief overview of the practice of international judicial bodies. Fi­
nally. it analyses some parts of the recently published Customary International 
Humanitarian Law Study of the International Committee of the Red Cross.1 *34
1 Sec e.g. Robert Y. Jennings, The Identification of International Law. in Bin Cheng (cd.)
International Law: Teaching and Practice. London. 1982, p. 3.
- Hersch Lauterpacht. The Problem of Revision of the Law of War. British Year Book of 
International Law, Vol. 29. 1952-53. p. 382.
3 Jason Beckett. PhD Dissertation. Chapter 5. (on tile with author. April 2006 version).
4 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Bcek. Customary International Humanitarian 
Law. Vol. I. Rules. Vol. 2. Practice, Cambridge University Press. 2005. (hereinafter ICRC 
study)
The constituent elements of customary international law:
State practice and opinio juris
'I he standard point of departure for the examination of customary law is Article 
38 (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice that accepts custom as 
a formal source of law for application of the Court as „evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law." This definition contains two elements. First, the ele­
ment of State practice (also referred to as objective or material element) and its 
acceptance as law. called opinio juris sive necessitatis (also known as subjec­
tive or psychological element).
There is no unanimity over what can be accepted as evidence of State practice. 
Physical acts are without doubt falling into this category, while the reliability 
of claims and other statements have been questioned.5 6Nonetheless, the major­
ity view seems to be that the source of State practice can be any public act 
emanating from a competent State organ or attributable to it.0 Omissions can 
also be deemed as State practice if the non-action by a State comes unambigu­
ously from the ,,conscious[ness| of having a duty to abstain.”7 8The length of 
time necessary for the creation of new custom cannot be defined in abstract 
terms, it can only be determined in a case-by-case evaluation. It seems certain 
that some time must elapse for State practice to become custom if it is both 
uniform and virtually extensive, including those States whose interests are spe­
cially affected.s
5 D’A mate submits that only physical acts arc reliable sources ol' State practice as statements 
and claims arc not consistent. Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International 
Law. Ithaka. 1971. p. 88. However he seems to be quite isolated in this view and strikes as 
odd to make a distinction between what the State does and what it says. Michael Akchurst. 
Custom as a Source of International Law. British Year Book of International Law Vol 47 
1974-1975. p. 3.
6 The International Law Association's Final Report examining the formation of customary law 
mentioned diplomatic statements (including protests), policy statements, press releases, 
official manuals, instructions to armed forces, comments by governments on draft treaties, 
legislation, decision of national courts and executive authorities, pleadings before 
international tribunals, statements in international organizations and the resolutions adopted 
by these treaties as verbal acts and arrests of people and seizure of property as physical acts 
remarking that the former is much more common. International Law Association London 
Conference (2000), Final Report of the Committee on Formation of Customary (General) 
International Law. Statements Applicable to the Formation of General Customary 
International Law. p. 14.
Lotus Case (France v. Turkey). RCIJ. Scries A. No. 10. p. 28.
8 ..Although the passage of only a short period of lime is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to 
the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was originally 
a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in 
question, short though it might be. Slate practice, including that of Stales whose interests arc 
specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the
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Opino juris is and indispensable element of custom. As Thirlway poetically 
explained ,,[T|he psychological element in the formation of custom, the phi­
losophers’ stone which transmutes the inert mass of accumulated usage into the 
gold of binding legal rules,”9 or in other words „[OJpinio juris is precisely what 
separates the wheat from the chaff.”10 However, the nature of the requirement 
of opinio juris is subject to great controversy. To explain why States should be 
legally bound to follow a certain conduct some authors -  the voluntarists -  
found the explanation in consent, viewing custom as an analogy of treaty being 
a tacit, informal manifestation of States’ will." Others consider that States are 
bound by custom because they act under the sense of a legal obligation.1'  How­
ever, both theories are susceptible to criticism.
Consent theory requires each State to give consent to be legally bound. But 
then, if opinio is reduced to the consent of individual states to be bound by the 
law, then that consent may be withdrawn with the same ease with which it was 
given.13 Taken to extremes, this simply robs customary international law of 
normativity. Any state wishing to act contrary to the rules of the legal system, 
can withdraw its consent, act -  as it cannot be a breach the rule no longer 
binding that State - and simply move on.14 Alternatively, if opinio juris is de­
fined as a belief in legality then changing existing customary rules becomes 
impossible.15 Thirlway noted that this view ,,[N|ecessarily implies a vicious 
circle in the logical analysis of the creation of custom. As a usage appears and 
develops, States may come to consider the practice to be required by law before
provision invoked...” North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Denmark and the Netherlands v. 
Germany). 1CJ Reports 1969. p. 43, para. 74. The requirement of the inclusion of specially 
affected States at first glance seems to violate the principle of sovereign equality but that only 
accepts the reality that some States have more inlluence on the formation of custom. As de 
Visschcr said, likening the formation of custom to the gradual wearing of a path, “Among the 
users are always some who mark the soil more deeply with their footprints than others, either 
because of their weight ... or because their interests bring them more frequently this way.” 
Charles dc Visscher. Theory and Reality in Public International Law. Princeton. 1968. p. 155.
9 Hugh Thirlway, International Customary Law and Codification. Leyden. 1972, p. 47.
10 Bin Cheng: Opinio juris: a key concept in international law that is much misunderstood, in: 
International Law in the Post-Cold War World -  Essays in memory of Li Haopci. Routledge.
2001. p. 66.
11 See e.g. Gregori Danilenko. The Theory of Customary International Law, German Yearbook 
of International l.aw. Vol. 31, 1989. p. 9.
12 See e.g. Olufemi Elias. The Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary International 
Law, International and Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol. 44. 1995. p. 501.
13 Maurice Mendelson. The Subjective Element in Customary International Law. Vol. 44, 
British Year Book of International Law. Vol. 44. 1995. pp. 184-194.
14 Jason Beckett. PhD Dissertation. Chapter 4. (on file with author. April 2006 version), p. 23.
15 Jorg Kammerhofer. Uncertainty in the formal Sources of International Law: Customary 
International Law and Some of Its Problems. European Journal of International Law. Vol. 15. 
2004. p. 536.
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this is in fact the case; but if the practice cannot become law until States follow 
it in the correct belief that it is required by law, no practice can ever become 
law, because this is an impossible condition.”16 *
Even if there was consensus on what State practice and opinio juris exactly 
meant, there would remain the question the proportion of constituting elements. 
I he so-called 11aditionul approach held that opinio juris has to be accompanied 
by a very extensive and almost uniform State practice. However, two scholars 
theorised that the existence of only one of these constituent element could be 
enough to expain the formation of custom. In his early scholarship, Kelsen 
offered the view that state practice was the only necessary element in the for­
mation of customary law.1 As Kammerhofer pointed out. this theory was in 
contravention with Kelson's own theory of law. 'This was a particularly 
strange error for Kelsen to make, because: [the] breach of the duality of Is and 
Ought [is] a legal theoretical ‘crime’ land, moreover,) it was Kelsen’s work 
which made this violation a theoretical ‘crime.”18 In general, this view is unten­
able as ”[T]he reason why the subjective element, formulated as opinio juris, is 
considered necessary is first to determine between ‘mere’ usage and customary 
norms, and second to delimit between customary law and other normative or­
ders.”19
A precise mirror image of Kelsen’s single element theory was developed by 
Bin Cheng.-0 Cheng submitted that State practice has no normative relevance in 
the establishment of custom, it is simply the evidence of opinio juris.'1 If it is 
so. in certain very limited circumstances General Assembly resolutions might 
give rise to customary law. While this theory seems to be the logical corollary 
of voluntarism, it fails to give explanation how to differentiate between norm- 
creating and other-especially political - statements.
In reaction to the emergence of new branches of international law -  especially 
international human rights law and international environmental law -  a 'mod­
ern' approach to custom appeared. Its proponents -  relying in particular on the 
International ( ourt of Justice (It J) s judgment in the Nicaragua case — argued 
that a strong showing of opinio juris can substitute for the scarcity of State
16 Supra note 9. p. 47.
1 Hans Kelsen. Thcorie du Droit International Coutumier. Revue International de la Thcorie du 
Droit. Vol.l. 1939, pp. 253-274.
18 Supra note 15. p. 546.
|9 Ibid. p. 535.
Bin Cheng. United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: „Instant" international customary 
law?, Indian Journal of International Law. Vol. 5. 1965. pp. 23-48.
1 Ibid. p. 36.
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practice and vice versa.”  Nevertheless, both traditional and modern concepts 
are vulnerable to Koskenniemi's criticism. ' He claims that international law is 
either apologetic, i.e. only describes what States actually do and attempts to 
justify these acts retroactively or utopian, which means that it tries to impose an 
arbitrary set of moral rules on the world that is completely separate from real­
ity. As international legal arguments seek to avoid either extreme they neces­
sarily oscillate between Apology and Utopia leading to indeterminacy of the 
content of legal norms.24
This critique can be answered by the application of the formalist methodologi­
cal framework constructed by Jason Beckett. He submits that as States are the 
primary actors in international law non-state conducts should be denied rele­
vance. In the absence of central law-making and adjudicating institutions with 
compulsory jurisdiction, the international community as a w hole creates inter­
national custom. As it is impossible to ascertain objectively a prion moral 
rules, morality should be dispensed with during the examination of the process 
of creation of custom.25 Opinio juris and State practice are inextricably inter­
twined in this framework. Opinio juris is understood as a combination of the 
normative intent of the acting state, and the reaction to those actions by the 
remainder of the international community, while Stale practice is the conduct 
of a State carried out with the normative intent or in reaction of the interna­
tional community.26 This way. customary norm is value-oriented at the moment 
of its creation but has to be applied in a value-neutral way which avoids oscil­
lation between Apology and Utopia.
The relationship between treaties and customary law
It is undisputed that a treaty can be evidence of customary law or the so-called 
historic or material source of custom, which is an inspiration for the formation 
of new custom.27 Much less evident is the notion of treaties having provisions 345*7
33 For an overview see Bruno Siimna. Philip Alston. The Sources of Human Rights Law: 
Custom, jus cogcns and general principles. Australian Year Book of International Law. Vol. 
12. 1989-1990. p. 82.
r’ Martti Koskenniemi. From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal 
Argument. Oxford. 1989.
34 For a synopsis of this thesis from the same author, see Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of 
International Law, F.uropean Journal of International Law, Vol. I. 1990. p. 4.
35 That does not mean that perceived morality of a legal rule -  such as its legitimacy -  cannot he 
inspirational for States to accept it as a rule of customary law. thus accelerating the
transformation of a norm to customary rule. But this is just a sociological, not legal, 
phenomenon. Sec Thomas Franck. The Power of Legitimacy among Nations. Oxford. 1990. 
Supra note 3.
37 Maurice 11. Mendclson. The Formation of Customary International Law. Vol. 272. 1998. pp. 
295-317.
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of a ..fundamentally norm-creating character” introduced by the International 
Court of Justice in the North Sect Continental Shelf cases.2* The Court seemed 
to suggest that this concept is connected with the ratification of the treaty con­
cerned.28 9
The notion of a provision of a ‘fundamentally norm-creating character’ is very 
difficult to explain under any theoretical framework. As Mendelson affirmed 
,.[I|f a State enters into a treaty, all that it is doing is entering into a treaty. Full 
stop. ... Entering into treaty ... is a practice directed to the conventional obli­
gation, not to general law. And the same is true to the implementation of the 
treaty. Of course this is ..State practice” in the literal sense of the words -  it is 
State behaviour; but it is directed to the performance of the treaty obligation.”30 
The Court’s suggestion might have roots in early notions of international law. 
In the era of classical international law, there was no clear-cut distinction be­
tween the conclusion of a treaty and the process of formation of international 
law. This could be partially due to the fact that the primacy of natural law was 
accepted by some authors and also because in more overtly hierarchical times 
(especially in the nineteenth century) the great powers were prone to regard 
what they agreed to as ipso facto part of general law. 31
Mendelson thinks that in exceptional and appropriate cases, treaties might be 
regarded as giving rise to. or helping to form, customary rules ..of their own 
impact” depending on looking at them as a kind of communication. If States 
decide to constitute a general legal regime binding upon all -  such as the 
United Nations Charter -  and the number of the parties is large and they are 
representative, it will constitute a „loud" message. Even though ideally non- 
parties should also subscribe to this expectation but ..at the end of the day, there 
seems to be no more reason for denying normative effect to a treaty clearly 
intended to have such an effect, just because there are some who do not partici­
pate. than there is to deny normative effect to a general practice accepted as 
law. in the traditional sense.”32 Nonetheless, he adds that „if a large number of 
States have indicated their unwillingness to accept the treaty's provisions, it 
becomes impossible to say that there is widespread acceptance of its content 
(without the addition of other Practice outside the treaty)," and suggests that in 
cases where widespread acceptance of a treaty as a source of customary law is 
dubious the onus should be on those w ho seek to use a treaty that way.33 Even 
so. „if the international community as a whole evinces a clear desire to change
28 Supra note 8. p. 42, para. 72.
Ibid. p. 25. para. 27.
Supra note 27. p. 324.
31 Ibid. p. 325.
Ibid. p. 328.
33 Ibid.
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customary law by means of a treaty, there seems to be no particular theoretical 
reason why this should be impossible.""1
Weil perceives this approach as threatening the sovereignty of States. He is 
concerned that „quasi-universal treaties" can give rise to „instant customary 
law" leading to the „relative normativity” of international law.34 5 According to 
Weil „[Tjhe conventional norm has not been frontally assaulted but cunningly 
outflanked ... in reality, the conventional norm itself may now create obliga­
tions incumbent upon all states, including those not parties to the convention in 
question.”36 This development could lead to the „tyranny of the majority” giv­
ing the opportunity to impose rules on the minority. Mendelson rebuts this 
argument by reminding that according to the ICJ there has to be „general rec­
ognition" that the rule in question is not merely conventional, but one of cus­
tomary law and there has to be an extensive and representative participation in 
the treaty and in any case, a State can always claim that it is a persistent objec­
tor.37 Still, Mendelson notes that it is disturbing if a „codifying" convention in 
the broad sense of the term is simply assumed, without more, to represent cus­
tomary law and national tribunals are particularly prone to this dangerous atti­
tude.38
In conclusion, it seems clear that treaties cannot give rise to customary law on 
their own impact apart from inspiring new custom. States entering into a treaty 
accept to be bound by conventional norms, not norms of customary interna­
tional law which is reflected to the reaction of States. Nonetheless, major inter­
national conferences of multi-lateral conventions can provide the impact for the 
birth of new customary rules.
The effect of General Assembly resolutions on customary norms
The General Assembly is a political organ where States representatives make 
political statements. Accordingly, ordinarily these statements are not meant to 
have a part in the formation of custom.
In the Nicaragua case, however, the ICJ declared that ,,|T]his opinio juris 
[about the binding legal obligation to refrain from the use of force contrary to 
the principles embodied in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter] may, though with 
all due caution, be deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the Parties and the
34 Ibid, p. 344.
35 Prosper Weil. Towards relative normativity in international law?, American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 77, 1983. p. 413.
36 Ibid. p. 438.
'' Supra note 27, p. 334.
38 Ibid. p. 339.
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attitude ol Stales towards certain General Assembly resolutions and particu­
larly resolution 2625 (XXV).'"'; In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion the 
Court added that ..General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, 
may sometimes have normative value. I hey can. in certain circumstances, pro­
vide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emer­
gence of an opinio juris. To establish whether this is true of a given General 
Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions of 
its adoption: it is also necessary to see whether an opinio juris exists as to its 
normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the gradual evolution 
of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new rule.”40
I hese statements seem to suggest that General Assembly resolutions can in 
certain circumstances contribute to the development of custom, and a series of 
resolutions might establish the existence of opinio juris, even without the ex­
amination of the conduct of the parties during the time of their adoption. Still, 
the latter statement cannot be accepted. Even ¡1 General Assembly resolutions 
are couched in legal language. ¡1 it is not accepted by the parties concerned that 
they reflect their normative will then they are merely political statements, not 
legal ones. On the other hand, if it can be inferred from the conduct of States 
that they intended to undertake legal obligation by voting for the resolution, 
then that is an evidence of Stale practice.
Roberts: an attempted reconciliation of traditional 
and modern approaches
One of the most acknowledged recent endeavours to reconcile the traditional 
and modern approach was produced by Anthea Roberts.41 The author -  draw­
ing on the 'sliding scale' concept of Kirgis4" and on its rationalized version on 
the basis of Dworkin’s interpretative theory of law4' - conceived a theory 
which attempted to balance moral content and descriptive accuracy without 
falling prey to Koskenniemi s criticism by becoming either apologetic or uto­
pian.44 To fulfil this promise. Roberts evaluates state practice and opinio juris 
in two stages seeking to balance descriptive accuracy and normative appeal in a 
Rawlsian reflective equilibrium.
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States) (Merits). IC.I Reports. 1986. pp. 0d-100. para. IS8.
Legality of the Threat or lisc of Nuclear Weapons. Advisor)' Opinion. 19%. ICJ Reports, para
Anthea Elizabeth Roberts. I radiuonal and Modern Approaches to Customary International
Law: A Reconciliation. American Journal of International Law. Vol. 95. 2001. p. 757.
Frederic L. Kirgis. Custom on a Sliding Scale, Vol. 81. 1987. p. 146
John tasioulas. In Defence ol Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and the
Nicaragua Case. Vol. 16. 1996. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, p. 85.
+* Supra note 23.
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First, the interpretation has to pass the dimension of fit to see whether it accu­
rately describes the raw data of practice. Alongside the dimension of fit. the 
interpretation has to be examined from the point of view of normative sub­
stance. which is the dimension of 111. In the second stage, the interpreter lias to 
find a balance between the dimensions of fit and substance to provide the 
greatest consistency with both elements.45 Traditional (in Roberts’ words 
„faci litative”) customs will lean towards the descriptive (the dimension of fit) 
as they do not involve strong moral issues, while modern customs with strong 
moral content have to be examined in a more normative equilibrium. With this 
approach, strong substantive considerations may compensate for a relatively 
weak fit and vice versa.46
The author mentions as an example the NATO intervention in the Federal Re­
public of Yugoslavia in 1999 as State practice contributing to the emergence of 
a possible right to humanitarian intervention in exceptional circumstances.4 It 
is obvious that the author has failed to establish a theory that could objectively 
evaluate the formation of customary law. Apart from tiie fact that the separa­
tion of State practice and opinio juris is entirely artificial the differentiation 
between faci litative and modern custom and the dimension of substance injects 
such a large amount of subjectivity into the theoretical framework that the ex­
istence of a customary norm can be asserted with only minimal practice if it is 
viewed as having an exceptionally strong moral content. This becomes clear 
from the author’s examination of the legality of the Kosovo intervention. While 
the intervening States did not affirm that the intervention was carried out in 
pursuance of a right to humanitarian intervention.4 Roberts is still willing to 
deem it as State practice together with interventions of the United States, 
France, and Great Britain in Iraq in 1991 -  that were also never alleged to have 
been humanitarian interventions -  as establishing an emerging right because of 
the substantive moral issues involved. A theory that is so patently subjective in 
the evaluation of practice in case of moral issues gives way to relative norma- 
tivity where the existence of a customary norm only depends on the interpreter. 45678
45 Supra note 41. pp. 761-764.
46 Ibid. pp. 764-766. This seems to be similar to the view of Schachter who held that ..patterns of 
conduct become State practice relevant to customary law when they concern matters generally 
within the domain of international law. In these cases explicit evidence of op in io  ju r is  may 
not be required." Oscar Schachter, Entangled Treaty and Custom, in Yoram Dinstcin (ed.) 
International Law at a Time of Pcrplexitiy. Kluwcr. 1989. p. 732.
47 Ibid, pp. 785-788.
48 The only exception being Belgium who asserted that right in front of the International Court 
of Justice. Case Concerning the Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium). Public 
Silting Held on Monday. 10 May 1999 at 3 p. m. Verbatim Record. CR 99/15.
Prosper Weil. Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 77. 1983. p. 413.
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Ihe second half of the paper will examine the questions of humanitarian cus­
tomary law.
Martens Clause -  The principle of humanity 
and the dictate of public conscience
The Martens Clause first appeared in the preamble to the 1899 Hague Conven­
tion (II) with respect to the laws and customs of war on land stating that:
„Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High 
Contracting Parties think deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not in­
cluded in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents 
remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the laws of nations, 
as they result from the usages established among civilized nations, from the 
laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.”50
This formulation was restated in the 1907 Hague Convention IV, a slightly 
modified version manifested in Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Con­
ventions,51 and it was included in numerous other conventions.52 In its 1996 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f the Threat or Use o f Nuclear Weapons 
(Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion) the International Court of Justice af­
firmed the relevance of the Martens Clause „whose continuing existence and 
applicability is not to be doubted” and declared that „it has proved to be an 
effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of military technology.”53
50 Adam Roberts, Richards Guclff, Documents on the laws of war, Oxford 2002 (Third cd ) n 
70.
51 Art- 1 (2) -In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians 
and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international 
law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of 
public conscience." Adam Roberts. Richards Guclff, supra note 50. p. 423.
52 Scc inter alia, the reference to ..the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of 
humanity” in the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use. Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Ottawa Convention). Adam 
Roberts. Richards Guclff, supra note 50, p. 648; or the affirmation that ..the rules governing 
the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict should reflect developments 
in international law”. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conllict (1999). Adam Roberts. Richards Guclff. 
supra note 50. p. 700.
Supra note 40. p. 257, paras. 87 and 78. This reference -  together with para. 84 -  was 
probably in part a reply to the extreme position submitted by Russia staling that „today the 
Martens Clause’ may formally be considered inapplicable.” Cited by Cassese, Antonio 
Cassese, The Martens Clause: Hall a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky? European Journal of 
International Law. Vol. 11. No. I. 2000. p. 211.
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The exact meaning of this provision is highly debated among scholars. Some 
authors state that it serves only as a reminder that customary law continues to 
apply after the adoption of a treaty norm. i.e. as a tool to exlude the a tout ratio 
argument that as certain matters are left unregulated by a treaty it could mean 
that the belligerents are left in complete liberty to act in that respect.M The 
drafting history of this provision seems to support this view. It seems that it 
was included in the 1899 Hague Convention (II) on the suggestion of Professor 
Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens, the Russian delegate, to resolve an impasse 
reached during the negotiations between smaller States (especially Belgium) 
and Great Powers. This deadlock resulted from the inability of the delegates to 
agree on the issue of which persons not belonging to the armed forces of the 
occupied country might be regarded as lawful combatants on occupied terri­
tory. The inclusion of this Clause seemingly pleased both sides but in reality it 
served to accomplish the intentions of the Great Powers, denying the right to 
revolt against the occupant in exchange for a few polished words.54 5
Other scholars argue that the Martens Clause is a general interpretative guide­
line according to which when doubts arise concerning the application of inter­
national humanitarian law the demands of humanity and public conscience 
have to be taken into account in the interpretation of these norms.56 The last 
group of publicists radically assert that the clause has expanded the sources of 
humanitarian law. In their view it created one -  or even two -  new sources: the 
laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.57
54 Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in: Dieter Fleck (ed.). The 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Oxford. 1995. p. 28. (para. 129.) Green 
draws attention to the all-participation clauses (si omnes) o f  the 1907 Hague Conventions that 
rendered the application o f the Conventions null and void if any o f the belligerents in a 
conflict were not a party to them. In these circumstances a reminder to the continuing 
applicability o f customary norms had even greater significance. Leslie C. Green, The 
contemporary law o f  armed conflicts. Manchester. 2000 (Second ed.) p. 34.
55 Sec in detail supra note 53, pp. 193-198.
56 Ibid. p. 190.
57 See e. g. B. V. A. Roling, International Law in an Expanded World, 1960. pp. 37-38. This 
concept might have been accepted in the jurisprudence of the United States Military Tribunal 
at Nuremberg in the Krupp case and by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). The United Slates Military Tribunal staled that the Martens Clause "is 
much more than a pious declaration. It is a general clause making the usages established 
among civilized nations, the laws o f  humanity and the dictates o f the public conscience into 
the legal yardstick to be applied if and when the specific provisions o f  the Convention... do 
not cover specific cases. Trials o f War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
under Control Council Law. No. 10, Vol. 9, Part II, p. 1338. In the Manic case Trial Chamber 
I declared that the prohibition o f attacks on civilians and the general principle limiting the 
means and methods o f warfare "also derive from the Martens Clause." Prosecutor v. Manic, 
1T-95-11-R6I. para 13.
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Following a thorough review of State practice and domestic and international 
case-law, C assese correctly found that the clause cl id not envisage two autono­
mous sources of international law. distinct from the customary process.5* He 
noted that the Martens Clause could be used as a general interpretative guide­
line. even though its content and scope ol application is not completely clear 
and the Clause might have been the "historical source' of the general principle 
of „elementary considerations of humanity".5'' spoilt out by the Court in the 
Corfu Channel' Case!'" the Nicaragua Case61 and the Nuclear Weapons Advi­
sory Opinion!'' However, he follows by the assertion that even though the Mar­
tens Clause operates within the existing system of international sources but. in 
the limited area of humanitarian law, loosens the requirements prescribed for 
State practice, while at the same lime elevating opinio juris to a rank higher 
than normally admitted. This supposed role should come from the need in the 
laws of armed conflict ..for humanitarian demands to efficaciously counter­
poise compelling military requirements and their devastating impact on human 
beings, even before such humanitarian demands have been translated into ac­
tual piactice. From the angle of legal interpretation, this conclusion could 
..rest upon the need to take account of the ... fundamental principle whereby 
legal clauses must be so construed to prove meaningful ... [and| the necessity 
to draw some legal sense from the widespread acclaim which the clause has 
attracted as a means of at least attenuating the most pernicious effects of mod-
r  «^>4ern warfare.
Fills conclusion is a sheer exercise in utopia. Referring to policy arguments. 
Cassese intends to introduce a new source in the field of humanitarian law un­
der the disguise of interpretation. He reveals that by setting forth that by refer­
ring to the need of existence of customary rules without actual practice. 
Cassese essentially applies a circular argument: first he states that the Martens 
( lause has legal sense only if it at least attenuates the most pernicious effects 
of modern warfare then concluding that as legal clauses have to be interpreted 
in a meaningful way the clause can give birth to customary rules with corre­
sponding Stale practice. Finally, even if Cassese’s proposition w'ould be in fact 
restricted to what he states — i. e. that Martens Clause gives more weisiht to 
opinio juris to help the formation of new customary rules -  it would be "based 
on the fundamental misunderstanding on the definition of State practice and
Cassese. supra note 53. p. 2 i I.
5‘' Ibid. pp. 212-213.
60 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania), ICJ Reports. 1949. p. 22.
11 Supra note 39. para. 218. 
w Supra note 40. p. 255. para. 79.
Cassese. supra note 53. p. 214. 
w Ibid. p. 215.
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opinio juris. As .State practice and opinio juris are inextricably intertwined, 
opinio juris cannot have an independent existence from State practice.6' Even 
accepting that Martens Clause is more than a simple reminder to the continuing 
applicability of customary law. in absence of the acceptance of the international 
community, it cannot be more than a principle that helps to achieve a more 
humane interpretation in case of possibly conflicting outcomes.
The methodology of international judicial bodies
After the Second World War, the four victorious powers -  Great Britain, 
France, the Soviet Union, and the United States of America -  established the 
International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg for the prosecution of the twenty- 
four major Nazi war criminals.65 6 This tribunal was complemented by the estab­
lishment of military tribunals to try the remaining war criminals in the occupa­
tion zones under Control Council Law No. I0.67 68*In Japan, the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East was set up by the United States Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief and stalled its work on 3 May 1946.6S
The international military tribunals -  especially the Nuremberg Tribunal -  as­
certained the customary status of numerous rules, in particular those contained 
in the Annex to Hague Convention IV on the Regulations Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land in spite of an all-participation clause and de­
clared that their violation brings about individual criminal responsibility with­
out examining the constitutive elements of State practice and opinio juris.66 For 
instance, in the High Command case, the US Military Tribunal regarded the 
Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929 largely as declaratory of custom 
by 1941.70 This tradition of declaring that certain rules attained customary 
status without an adequate examination of State practice and opinio juris lol- 
lowed in the work of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals.71 Already in
65 See supra p. 5.
66 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals o f  the European 
Axis. 8 August 1945. UNTS Vol. 8. p. 279.
67 International Law Reports. Vol. 36. p. 31.
68 For a thorough description of the Tribunal’s work see B. V. A. Ruling. C. F. Rtiter (cds.) The 
Tokyo Judgment. Amsterdam. 1977.
w For a particularly critical analysis o f the work o f  the Tribunal sec Hans Kclscn. Will the 
Judgment in Nuremberg Constitute a Precedent in International Law?. International Law 
Quarterly. Vol. I. 1947, p. 11.
70 United States v. Von Lech (The High Command Case), in: Trials o f War Criminals before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals. 1950. Vol. 10. pp. 1-1322. Vol. 11. pp. .•>-756.
71 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was set up by 
Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993. UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). The Inter­
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1CTR) was established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994. UN Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
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its first case, the Tadic jurisdiction decision the ICTY held that there exists a 
large body ol customary norms regulating non-international armed conflicts 
and their breach incurred individual criminal responsibility, even though it was 
a novelty for most experts.72
The International Court of Justice did not fare much better in this respect. In 
the Nicaragua case, one striking feature of the decision was that the Court re­
gal ded ( ommon Article 1 and 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as customary 
law without any further inquiry of the process.73 On the other hand, the Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion was markedly different in the very careful identifi­
cation of the relevant principles of international humanitarian law.74
The Wall Advisory Opinion75 returns to the „light treatment of international 
humanitarian law.”76 As Kretzmer remarked ,.[T|he opinion is especially weak 
on questions ol international humanitarian law. which makes it extremely diffi­
cult to know what the Court actually decided on these questions.”77 This was 
particularly conspicuous from the examination of the question whether the 
Principle of military necessity could justify seemingly unlawful acts committed 
during the construction of the wall. Here the Court simply confused the concept 
of military necessity with the state of necessity78 precluding the wrongfulness 
of an internationally wrongful act ignoring the fact that the International Law 
C ommission itself noted that these are separate notions. In international hu­
manitarian jaw, military necessity is an integral part of the law and does not 
override it.'1 While the state of necessity is a circumstance exceptionally pre­
cluding the wrongfulness of an act that otherwise would not be in comformity
Prosecutor v. Tadic. Decision o f 2 October 1995 on ihc Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction. IT-94-I-AR72. The judgment has been extensively criticised by many 
publicists. See inter alia Christopher Greenwood. The Development o f International Humani­
tarian Law by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Max Planck 
"1 earhook ol United Nations Law. 1998. p. 97: W olff Hcintschel von Heincgg, Criminal In­
ternational Law and Customary International Law. in: Andreas Zimmcrmann (cd.) Interna­
tional Criminal Law and the Current Development o f  Public International Law. Berlin, 2003. 
For supporting the decision sec Theodor Merőn. International Criminalization o f Internal 
Atrocities, American Journal o f  International Law. Vol. 89. 1995, p. 554.
7 ’ Supra note 39, paras. 217-220.
Supra note 40. paras. 74-92. Indeed, some authors were disappointed that the ICJ had not 
applied a wider scope o f humanitarian norms. See c. g. Timothy L. II. McCormick. A non li­
quet on nuclear weapons -  The ICJ avoids the application o f general principles o f interna- 
_ lional humanitarian law. International Review of the Red Cross. No. 316. 1997, p. 76.
Legal Consequences o f the Construction o f  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
Advisory Opinion o f 9 July 2004. ICJ Reports. 2004, p. 136.
David Kretzmer. The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian 
Law. American Journal o f International Law, Vol. 99. 2005 p 88 
77 Ibid. p. 88.
7 Supra note 75, para. 140.
7<> See Christopher Greenwood, supra note 54. p. 33.
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with international law, in IHL only when military necessity is absent does the 
general law prohibiting an act apply. It seems that Judge Higgins justifiedly 
commented that „the Court’s findings of law are notably general in character, 
saying remarkably little as concerns the application of the Hague Rules or the 
Fourth Geneva Conventions along particular sections of the route of the 
wall.”80
It seems that the ICJ is identifying and applying customary humanitarian norms 
acts in a fairly liberal way, frequently not citing evidence of State practice and 
opinio juris. It must be noted, however, that the Court never asserted that cus­
tomary humanitarian norms would undergo a different formation than rules of 
general international law and never mentioned the possibility that the inherent 
humanitarian content of a humanitarian norm would accelerate its transforma­
tion into customary rule even in the absence of State practice and opinio juris.
The Customary Law Study of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC)
In 1995, the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
requested the International Committee of the Red Cross to prepare a report on 
the customary rules of international humanitarian law applicable in interna­
tional and non-international armed conflicts,81 82 following a similar recom­
mendation from an inter-governmental group of experts.Following almost 10 
years of research, the study was finally published in March 2005 under the 
authorship of Jean-Marie Henckacrts and Louise Doswald-Beck.8' The purpose 
of the study was to overcome some of the problems incurring from the 
application of international humanitarian law treaties by identifying the 
relevant rules of customary humanitarian law that bind parties and non-parties 
alike.
In their approach to identify customary humanitarian law the authors followed 
an inductive approach. Instead of analysing the customary status of humanitar­
ian treaty provisions, they undertook an evaluation of State practice. Deter­
mining what State practice is for the purpose of customary law and what meth­
odology to use to deduce custom from it they followed closely the approach 
used by the International Court of Justice in its evaluation of customary law, 
based primarily on the judgments rendered in the North Sea Continental Shelf
80 Supra note 75, Judge Higgins Separate Opinion, para. 40.
81 Resolution I, adopted during the 26th Conference o f the Red Cross and Red Crescent 3-7 
December 1995.
82 Intergovernmental Group of Experts for the Protection o f War Victims, 23-27 January 1995, 
Recommendation II.
8' Supra note 4.
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cases and the Nicaragua case. The authors also relied on the 2000 Final Report 
of the International Law Association on the Formation of Customary Interna­
tional Law*4 which was primarily based on Mendelson’s Flague Lecture in the 
same subject.s A novel element in their approach appeared in the inclusion in 
some parts of the study of international human rights law to help establish the 
customary nature of some humanitarian law rules, particularly those relating to 
non-international armed conflicts.86
Following the methodology of international tribunals, only practice of States 
emanating from official sources was evaluated that included both physical ac­
tions and verbal acts such as battlefield behaviour, use of weapons, legislation, 
military manuals and official statements, international judicial decisions were 
taken into account not as examples of State practice -  as international judicial 
bodies are not State organs -  but as persuasive evidence of law, but in case of 
clash between Slate practice and case-law. State practice prevailed. Moreover, 
the practice of international organisations and the ICRC was also included, but 
it was given very limited weight while reliance on legal scholarship was strictly 
limited to information gained on State practice and summaries of international 
jurisprudence. As regards the practice of armed opposition groups such as 
codes of conduct, the authors decided against taking them into account in their 
evaluation of State practice, even though some examples were mentioned.87
During the evaluation of State practice and opinio juris the authors established 
the customary nature of certain rules on the basis of State practice that was 
virtually uniform, widespread and representative. Apart from certain special 
cases, as the use of particular weapons, no State was deemed „specially af­
fected' as all States have a legal interest in the implementation of humanitarian 
law. „Treaty practice”, i. e. the number of ratifications and the content of reser­
vations and statements of interpretation was also judged to be relevant. As to 
the evaluation of opinio juris, the determination of legal conviction became 
especially important in cases of abstentions. Since a substantial part of the con­
duct of Stales consists of omission, the nature of abstentions was determined 
relying on the circumstances.88
International Law Association London Conference (2000). Final Report o f the Committee on 
Formation o f Customary (General) International Law, Statements Applicable to the Forma­
tion of General Customary International Law. 
s> Supra note 27.
Louise Doswald Beck. Developments in Customary International Law. Schweizerische 
Zeitung für Internationales und Europäisches Recht, 2005, p. 474. 
b Jean-Marie Henckacrts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution 
to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule o f Law in Armed Conflict. International 
Review o f  the Red Cross. No. 857, 2005. p. 179-180. 
s' For a detailed description o f the methodology used to ascertain custom in the ICRC Study see 
Jean-Marie Henckacrts, Ibid. p. 175; Louise Doswald Beck, supra note 86. p. 4 7 1.
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In the following part I attempt to analyse some of the conclusions reached by 
the authors in a critical light.
Rule 42. W orks and installations containing dangerous forces
Article 56 (1) of Additional Protocol I. provides that:
„Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and 
nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, 
even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the 
release of dangerous forces and consequent severe lossess among the civilian 
population.”
This provision was generally regarded as codification of new law and was re­
jected by major military powers. During the Gulf conflict, coalition forces tar­
geted and put out two Iraqi nuclear power stations.89 The ICRC study conse- • 
quently does not state that there is a general prohibition of attacks against in­
stallations containing dangerous forces. Drawing on statements made by inter 
alia France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Israel90 it concludes, 
however, that there is a rule of customary international law requiring additional 
care during the targeting of installations containing dangerous forces and its 
scope is wider than the installations contained in Additional Protocol I. It is 
applicable to all installations containing such forces including e.g. chemical 
plants and petroleum refineries.91
Still, it is not entirely clear what the rationale of this rule as a separate custom­
ary norm would be. It stands to reason that targeting such installations involves 
a greater risk of injury to civilian objectives, consequently, during the targeting 
procedure the proportionality assessment will take this factor into account, so it 
is simply a corollary of the principle of proportionality.
Rule 159. The obligation to endeavour to grant the widest 
possible amnesty at the end of a non-international armed conflict
The ICRC Study declares that
„At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power must endeavour to grant the 
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in a non-intema-
S9 Christopher Greenwood, Customary International Law and the First Geneva Protocol o f 1977 
in the Gulf Conflict, in: Peter Rowe (ed.) The Gulf War 1990-91 in International and English 
Law. Routledge, 1993. pp. 81-82.
90 Supra note 4, p. 140.
91 Ibid. pp. 141-142.
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tional armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the 
armed conflict, with thê  exception of persons suspected of. accused of or sen­
tenced for war crimes.”92
This rule is an almost verbatim restatement of Article 6 (5) of Additional Pro­
tocol II.93
The Study attempted to prove the existence of this purported rule by reference 
to certain States granting amnesty and to General Assembly and Security 
Council resolutions encouraging States to grant amnesty.94
Nonetheless, this argument is less than convincing. The cited examples do not 
prove the existence of a normative will from the States that would transform 
their conduct to State practice. All that can be concluded that there is a policy 
objective to grant amnesty at the end of non-international armed conflicts to 
promote reconciliation. Moreover, this provision is simply incapable of be­
coming a legal rule. Its phrasing is only hortatory, it does not contain any obli­
gations on States which is a good indication of soft law.
Rule 160. Statutes of limitation may not apply to war crimes
The authors trace back the evolution of this rule to the 1968. UN Convention 
on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes against Humanity 
and War Crimes and the 1974 European Convention on the Non-Applicability 
of Statutory Limitations to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes. They 
attribute special significance to the fact that between 1969 and 1973 a string of 
General Assembly resolutions called on States to ratify the UN Convention and 
the votes incurred substantial abstentions and just few negative votes.95 The 
study concludes that „iT]he recent trend to pursue war crimes more vigorously 
in national and international criminal courts and tribunals, as well as the grow­
ing body of legislation giving jurisdiction over war crimes without time-limits, 
has hardened the existing treaty rules prohibiting statutes of limitation for war 
crimes into customary law.”96
92 Ibid. p. 610.
93 ,.At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest 
possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of 
their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or detained.” 
Adam Roberts. Richard Guclff, supra note 50. p. 488.
94 Supra note 4. pp. 611-612.
95 Ibid. p. 615. They apparently do not attribute much significance to the fact that the ratification 
o f the Convention itself was not very substantial.
96 Ibid. p. 615.
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This conclusion seems to borne out from some actual State practice, treaty 
practice and reaction to General Assembly resolutions. Apart from the fact that 
treaty practice is not a factor in determining custom and that the reaction to 
General Assembly resolutions does not seem to be motivated by normative 
intent, it is very difficult to see how a ..trend” could transform a rule to custom­
ary norm in the absence of extensive and virtually uniform practice.
The prohibition of deception in non-international armed conflicts
The ICRC Study lists nine rules between Rule 57 and 65 concerning deception 
in non-international armed conflicts. A common feature of all these rules is the 
almost complete absence of State practice. Most of the rules were included in 
the draft of Additional Protocol II. but were deleted from the finalized version. 
The authors mention as example the Memorandum of Understanding on the 
Application of International Humanitarian Law between Croatia and the So­
cialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which is only an evidence of contrac­
tual obligation between the warring parties, even though they find a few mili­
tary manuals actually containing these prohibitions.97 *9
To somehow solidify their work, the authors recourse to policy arguments. To 
prove that the improper use of white flag of truce is prohibited in non-interna­
tional armed conflicts (Rule 58), they state that „It can be concluded that the 
general abstention from improperly using the white flag of truce in practice is 
based on a legitimate expectation to that effect.”"  Similarly, the prohibition of 
use of the flags or military emblems, insignia or uniforms of neutral" or other 
States not party to the conflict (Rule 63) is also contingent upon the „legitimate 
expectation that parties to a non-international armed conflict abide by this rule 
is part of customary international law.”100
While from the point of view of humanizing warfare the customary status of 
these rules would be without any doubt advantageous, only State practice can 
give rise to customary law. In its absence these rules pertain to the empire of 
morality and of course to domestic criminal law.
97 ibid. p. 206. p. 209.
9S Ibid. p. 207.
99 The use of the lerin ’neutral" is very peculiar in the context o f non-international armed con­
flicts, as neutrality is a category pertaining to inter-state armed affairs unless the insurgents 
are granted belligerent recognition.
100 Supra note 4, p. 219.
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Conclusion
Customary international humanitarian law -  in spite of the contrary practice of 
international courts and tribunals and the claims made by authors and the ICRC 
Study -  is not different from any other branches of customary international 
law. While it is understandable that many feel that the present situation where 
States are unwilling to give indication about the state of law in many respects is 
undesirable for humanitarian causes, this discontention cannot give rise to 
claims about the existence of customary rules without respecting practice. Even 
though it may temporarily satisfy our sense of justice, in the end these tenden­
cies could be destructive for the international legal system by destabilizing it.
SUMMARY
Dr. Opinio Juris and Mr. State Practice: The Strange Case 
of Customary International Humanitarian Law
TAMÁS HOFFMANN
The essay offers a brief overview of issues in customary international humani­
tarian law.
First it introduces the main components of general customary international law, 
state practice and opinio juris. Then it outlines a formalistic method of inquiry 
that can be used to examine customary international law without contradic­
tions.
Next the essay discusses the relationship of customary international law and the 
treaties, and that of the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly 
and customary international law. Presenting a theory associated w'ith the name 
of Anthea Roberts, the author explains why it is impossible to amalgamate 
traditional and modern theories of customary international law.
The second part of the treaties focuses on issues of customary international 
humanitarian law. By analysing the history and possible interpretations of the 
Martens Clause, it answers the question whether or not the principle of human­
ity has created a new instrument of law. which can only be found in customary 
international law. Then by presenting some legal cases in the practice of the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
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mer Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The 
Hague, the author offers a method for examining customary international hu­
manitarian law.
Finally, the essay discusses a monograph issued by the International Red Cross 
on customary international humanitarian law. First the methods applied by the 
authors of the book are analysed, then some norms the authors of the book refer 
to as rules of customary law are given a critical analysis.
The essay draws the final conclusion that the characteristics of customary hu­
manitarian law do not differ from the rules of general customary law.
RESÜMEE
Dr. Opinio Juris und Mr. Staatspraxis: Der besondere Fall 
des internationalen Gewohnheitsrechts
TAMÁS HOFFMANN
Die Studie versucht einen kurzen Überblick über die Fragen des humanitären 
internationalen Gewohnheitsrechts zu geben.
Zuerst stellt sie die wichtigsten Elemente des allgemeinen internationalen Ge­
wohnheitsrechts. die Staatspraxis und die opinio juris vor und zeigt dann eine 
formalistische Untersuchungsmethode auf, mit deren Hilfe das internationale 
Gewohnheitsrecht ohne Widersprüche untersucht werden kann.
Danach untersucht die Arbeit die Beziehung zwischen dem internationalen 
Gewohnheitsrecht und den Verträgen, sowie zwischen den UNO-Versamm- 
lungsbeschlüssen und dem internationalen Gewohnheitsrecht. Im Anschluss 
daran legt sie über die Untersuchung der Theorie von Anthea Roberts dar. wa­
rum die traditionellen und die modernen Theorien bezüglich des internationa­
len Gewohnheitsrechts nicht miteinander gekreuzt werden können.
Der zweite Teil der Studie beschäftigt sich nunmehr spezifisch mit den Fragen 
des internationalen humanitären Gewohnheitsrechts. Zuerst beleuchtet die Ar­
beit mit Hilfe der Analyse der Geschichte und der möglichen Interpretation der 
Martens’sehen Klausel, ob das Humanitätsprinzip eine neue, nur im humanitä­
ren Gewohnheitsrecht existierende Rechtsquelle geschaffen hat. Danach gibt 
sie mit Hilfe einiger ausgewählter Rechtsfälle einen Überblick über die Unter­
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suchungsmethode des internationalen humanitären Gewohnheitsrechts der in­
ternationalen Richtergremien -  Militärgerichtshof Nürnberg, Internationaler 
Strafgerichtshof für das ehemalige Jugoslawien und Internationales Gericht.
Die Studie endet schließlich mit der Analyse des Werkes über das internatio­
nale Gewohnheitsrecht, das unlängst vom Internationalen Roten Kreuz heraus­
gegeben wurde. Im Anschluss an die Vorstellung der methodologischen Cha­
rakteristika werden einige Normen kritisch untersucht, die die Verfasser des 
Buches für Gewohnheitsrechtsregeln halten.
Die Schlussfolgerung der Arbeit ist, dass die Charakteristika des humanitären 
internationalen Gewohnheitsrechts von den allgemeinen Gewohnheitsrechtsre­
geln nicht abweichen.
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